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Following the May ’68 student and worker uprisings in Paris, a number of  critical think-
ers reworked their analyses of  power in order to take account of  the social and political forces 
that had effectively squelched the revolutionary moment and extinguished any radical poten-
tial.  In several cases—notably, for Foucault and Althusser—the evolution of  their thought 
followed a parallel trajectory: at first, they organized their analyses around the notion of  
repression; but quickly thereafter, they reoriented their analyses toward the more productive 
dimensions of  repressive power, with the ambition to unearth the sources of  reproduction of  
social processes, practices, and institutions.
My argument in this essay is that this shared historical trajectory—or, perhaps, path 
dependence—colored the critical theorization of  power for years, if  not decades.  There was 
what I call a “repressive hangover” during the post-68 period that overshadowed much of  the 
critical analyses.  Despite explicit rejections of  the repressive model—including, for instance, 
Foucault’s criticism of  the repressive hypothesis in The Will to Know—this repressive hang-
over continued to have a significant effect on the style of  critique that emerged in the 1970s.
There were, to be sure, critical thinkers who more actively resisted the recurrence of  
repressive undertones—notably Deleuze and Guattari, drawing in part on Wilhelm Reich. 
And there were others, drawing on the earlier works of  Marcuse, who also pushed beyond 
the originary condition of  repression and resisted the temptation to backtrack on the “great 
refusal.”  But these forward-looking interventions often had the paradoxical effect of  rein-
forcing the repressive hangover elsewhere.  Despite Foucault’s admiration for Anti-Oedipus, 
for instance, Foucault would develop, as a counterweight, his own theory of  power in The 
Punitive Society and in Discipline and Punish that would refocus attention on the prison as 
metaphor for power relations throughout society.
Foucault would eventually overcome the repressive hangover beginning in about 1980, 
after studying neoliberal governmentality in his 1979 lectures, The Birth of  Biopolitics, and 
returning to the theme of  subjectivity.  His exploration of  the arts of  living, of  techniques 
of  the self, of  the care of  the self  can be interpreted as an effort to incorporate elements that 
would previously have fallen under the rubric of  repression—for instance, the notion of  
subject formation (subjectivation) is closely tied to earlier notions of  subjugation (assujettisse-
ment)—into the deeper subjective processes of  the formation of  the self.  Foucault’s turn to 
avowal and truth-telling in his Louvain lectures in 1981, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, reflects 
precisely the ambition to understand better how we, as subjects, bind ourselves to the social 
order at the very moment that we take care of  ourselves.
Other critical thinkers also turned to these more subjective themes in order to reveal how 
productive forces shape society.  Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello provide a rich, recent illus-
tration of  this in The New Spirit of  Capitalism (1999), where they demonstrate how, begin-
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ning in the mid-1970s and onwards, management theory abandoned the more repressive, 
hierarchical, Fordist model and instead embraced a more entrepreneurial, employee-initiated 
creative and autonomous model that allows workers to see their artistic selves—or subjec-
tivities—in their work environment.  The new management techniques harness the artistic 
critique of  alienation at the heart of  the May ’68 protests in order to recast a new spirit of  
capitalism, while simultaneously disabling the social critiques by means of  neoliberal ratio-
nalities.  In this way, the revolutionary potential of  May ’68 was captured and rechanneled 
toward capital accumulation.
However, it is not critical theory or its evolution that would finally extricate us from 
the repressive hangover, so much as new digital technologies and the Internet of  Things. 
The explosion of  a digital economy that thrives on the basis of  “likes,” “follows,” “shares,” 
“retweets,” and “LinkedIn invitations”—a political economy, in other words, that operates 
on the number of  joyful clicks and downloads—has practically on its own, almost single-
handedly, switched the gears forward and pushed us past the repressive hangover.
The displacement of  Orwellian hatred and repression, and their replacement by desire 
and passion—which I explore and develop in Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital 
Age (Harvard 2015)—has moved us beyond the model of  repressive power.  It may be, then, 
that we are only extricating ourselves from the repressive hangover now as a result of  tech-
nological innovation, the systems of  knowledge that surround them, and the way power 
circulates in the digital age.
Some critical thinkers will contest this, others may lament it, and yet others will argue 
that it may be fruitful for our understanding of  the present.  I cautiously lean towards the 
latter view.  Cautiously in the sense that, as I will suggest in this essay, the emergence of  new 
conceptions of  power in the digital age, tied to desire and jouissance, must be wedded both to 
expressly repressive models of  power and to the more productive theories of  power.
In this essay, I will put a spotlight on three moments in the history of  critical theory as I 
have set it out, focusing, first, on the repressive hangover in Foucault and Althusser; second, 
on Foucault’s overcoming of  that hangover by means of  his return to subjectivity; and third, 
on our present digital condition analyzed through the lens of  desire rather than repression.  I 
will then suggest that our critical project, going forward, would benefit most from a marriage 
of  the three critical stages.
I. The Repressive Hangover in Foucault and Althusser
The initial hypothesis of  a repressive hangover involves a three-step movement: first, a 
turn to repression as a way to understand power post-68; second, a movement against repres-
sion to study the productive elements of  power; and third, the repressive hangover.
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A. The First Two Moments: Moving Beyond Repression
Foucault’s lectures and writings most clearly follow the path of  the first two moments. 
His first and most direct engagement with political power post ’68 was through his analysis 
of  the repression of  the Nu-pieds rebellions in Normandy in 1639 in the first seven lessons of  
his 1971–72 lectures, Théories et institutions pénales, at the Collège de France.
To be sure, prior to those lectures, Foucault had frequently addressed the different ways 
of  excluding and marginalizing the figures that were perceived as threats—through the 
epistemological distinction between reason and madness, and the other techniques that 
divided truth from falsity.  From The History of  Madness in 1961 through his first set of  
Lectures on the Will to Know in 1970–71, Foucault consistently analyzed the different ways 
that society has effectively parsed populations by imprisoning or medicalizing the mad, and 
rendering some discourses illegible and others reasonable.  His inaugural address, The Order 
of  Discourse, set out this very project: to explore how “the opposition between true and false” 
serves as a system of  exclusion as powerful as legal prohibitions or claims of  reason.1
There is, however, a distinct rupture in his research project on November 24, 1971, when 
he begins Théories et institutions pénales brusquely, without an introduction: “No introduc-
tion,” Foucault jots down in his notes.  “The raison d’être of  this course: One need only open 
one’s eyes.”2  Outside, the CRS and national police lined the streets.  Non-parliamentary 
leftist parties were outlawed.  Hundreds of  militants, especially young Maoist militants 
of  the Gauche prolétarrienne, had been arrested and imprisoned.  Foucault did not need 
an “introduction” to his topic, because everyone knew he was addressing the French state 
repression that surrounded both him and everyone sitting at the Collège.  And so, Foucault 
launched into seven intensely detailed lessons on the repression of  the Nu-pieds rebellion: a 
historical analysis that traces the birth of  a repressive judicial/policing apparatus in France.
As François Ewald suggested at Foucault 2/13, Foucault articulates in 1972 a model 
of  repressive power relations.3  The model took, as its object, certain revolutionary or sedi-
tious actors, but not all.  The repression was not monolithic; some rebels were spared.  It 
operated through the representatives of  the king, who united the functions of  administering 
justice and using military force, by means of  a conjoint exercise of  military power and of  
civil authority, in an unprecedented mixture.  It deployed tactics of  subjectivation of  certain 
actors as enemies, a final judgment of  wrongdoing, and dependence on the mystery of  the 
sentence; as well as strategies of  the dramatization of  politics, of  the use of  ceremony and 
rituals.  And it produced a particular outcome: not simply the production of  order, or the 
 1 Foucault, The Discourse on Language, in The Archaeology of  Knowledge, p. 217.
 2 Foucault, Théories et institutions pénales, p. 3; BnF folio 1.
 3 See Harcourt, “The Stakes of  the Balibar-Ewald Debate,” at http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/
foucault1313/2015/10/03/the-stakes-of-the-balibar-ewald-debate/
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reestablishment of  peace, but rather the production of  a new form of  power, namely the 
administrative state.  The state of  police.
This engagement with the repressive model of  power was in part an outgrowth of  
Foucault’s political involvement in the Prisons Information Group, a visceral experience that 
would produce a keen awareness of  the seriousness of  the struggles.  It is not hard to imag-
ine that his simultaneous turn to the notion of  “civil war” as the basic matrix to understand 
social order was an outgrowth of  this period.  The repressive model loomed largest in 1972 
and 1973, during and after the peak of  the prison riots in France: the revolt in the Ney prison 
of  Toul in December 1971, the Charles-III jail of  Nancy on 15 January 1972, and the pris-
ons of  Nîmes, Amiens, Loos, Fleury-Mérogis among others.4  After the revolt at Toul, on 5 
January 1972, in a joint press conference of  the G.I.P. and the Comité Vérité Toul, Foucault 
declares that “what took place at Toul is the start of  a new process: the first phase of  a politi-
cal struggle directed against the entire penitentiary system by the social strata that is its pri-
mary victim.”5  Civil war comes to fore at the same time as he analyzes repression.
But as we know well, Foucault would famously move away from the repressive model 
of  power rapidly, and turn instead to the productive dimensions of  power relations.  I have 
detailed this at length in the “Course Context” to The Punitive Society.6  Starting as early as 
April 1972, after he visits Attica, and throughout the 1973 lectures, Foucault goes beyond 
this repressive model of  power—leading, of  course, to the famous passage in Discipline and 
Punish making clear that his focus is on the productive, not the repressive, aspects of  punishment:
Do not concentrate the study of  the punitive mechanisms on their ‘repressive’ effects alone, on their 
‘punishment’ aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of  their possible positive effects, 
even if  these seem marginal at first sight.  As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex 
social function.7
 4 See La Révolte de la prison de Nancy. 15 January 1972.  Documents et propos de Michel Foucault, 
Jean-Paul Sartre et de militants du Groupe d’information sur les prisons (Paris:  Le Point du jour, 
2013).  Foucault gave his unreserved support to political prisoners and common law prisoners 
without distinction.  As he elaborated the notion of  “civil war,” the very distinction—political 
prisoner and common law prisoner—no longer had any sense.  This is an important aspect, both 
theoretical and practical, of  Foucault’s intervention at this time.  See M. Foucault, “Sur la justice 
populaire.  Débat avec les maos” (interview with Gilles et Victor, 5 February 1972, Les Temps 
modernes, no. 310 bis, pp. 355–366), DE, II, no. 108, pp. 340–369/“Quarto,” vol. I, pp. 1208–1237; 
English translation by John Mepham, “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” in Michel 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, ed., Colin Gordon 
(Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980).
 5 La Révolte de la prison de Nancy, p. 19 (reproduction of  the manuscript page).
 6 See Foucault, The Punitive Society, at pp. 267–269 and 279–281.
 7 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 23.
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Althusser would travel along a similar path.  He too, at about the same time, would 
complement his analysis of  repressive state apparatuses with an exploration of  the “ideo-
logical state apparatuses” that function not predominantly through repression, coercion, and 
punishment, but through persuasion, ideology, etc.
Althusser’s starting point was, of  course, repression.  “The Marxist tradition is 
strict, here,” he writes in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation)” in 1969: “in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire (and in 
the later classical texts; above all, Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune and Lenin’s on 
State and Revolution), the State is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus.”8  Althusser 
goes so far as to say: “The State is a ‘machine’ of  repression which enables the ruling classes 
[…] to ensure their domination over the working class…”9 This is the State comprised of  the 
police, the prisons, the army, the law—and its basic function is to be “a force of  repressive 
execution and intervention ‘in the interests of  the ruling classes’…”10
By contrast, there are a set of  institutions that Althusser examines under the rubric of  
“Ideological State Apparatuses,” which function predominantly by other means than repres-
sion.  These include the different churches and religious establishments, the schools and 
universities, the family, the different political parties, the media, press, radio and television, 
and the cultural establishments, including the arts, literature, entertainment, and sports.11 
These institutions, most importantly, the educational ones, function on a different model than 
repression, one that Althusser describes as “ideological.”
b. The Stickiness of  Repression in Foucault and Althusser
Despite this important shift in both Foucault and Althusser—at about the same time in 
the post-’68 period—both thinkers remained somewhat trapped in a repressive hang-over.  For 
both, the model of  even productive non-repressive (or not primarily repressive) power remained 
linked to the internalization of  social relations vis-à-vis a demanding other—often the police or 
prison guard.  In other words, the repressive social bond continued to colonize their writings.
For Althusser, the theory of  ideological interpellation was grounded in the example of  
the police officer who calls the subject out.  The two main illustrations he offers—the first 
being, of  course, the one that everyone uses to understand the very notion of  interpellation—
are the police officer hailing the subject and the person behind the entrance door asking, 
“who’s there?”  Althusser offers only two “highly ‘concrete’ examples,” both of  which have 
come down in critical theory as leitmotifs: the heart of  his theoretical intervention, in his own 




 11 Ibid., p. 17.
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words, “can be imagined along the lines of  the most commonplace everyday police (or other) 
hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’”12
“Hailing as an everyday practice governed by a precise ritual takes spectacular form in 
the police practice of  hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’”13 And when the illustration is not the police 
officer in the street, it is the “cop in your head.”14  This is a well known reference to the cover 
drawing on the Action weekly paper stating “Get rid of  the cop in your head!” that Althusser 
criticizes in his (posthumously) published work, On Ideology in On the Reproduction of  
Capitalism, but again, places at the heart of  the discussion.
When Foucault turns away from the repressive, he also ends up in the very heart of  
punitive detention—in the panopticon prison cell.  This is, of  course, despite his repeated 
insistence that the critical method had to break off  from the traditional obsession with sov-
ereign power; that, methodologically, his own approach “entails leaving the problem of  the 
State, of  the State apparatus, to one side.”15  As he would write in his manuscripts in 1974, 
“we cannot use the notion of  State apparatus because it is much too broad, much too abstract 
to designate these immediate, tiny, capillary powers that are exerted on the body, behavior, 
actions, and time of  individuals.  The State apparatus does not take this microphysics of  
power into account.”16  And yet, although Foucault would help us discern the extraordinarily 
capillary nature of  relations of  power, the central metaphor he deployed in his productive 
phase was prison architecture.
Now, it was of  course an extremely powerful image and metaphor, particularly in invert-
ing the metaphor of  the spectacle that Guy Debord had so convincingly elaborated in his 
Society of  the Spectacle.17  Foucault’s reading of  Nikolaus Julius and Bentham, and his inver-
sion of  the logic of  the spectacle into the panopticon was a tour de force.  A brilliant move 
that we can recognize in this passage from his Collège de France lectures on The Punitive 
Society in 1973:
[T]his is precisely what happens in the modern era: the reversal of  the spectacle into surveillance. 
We are in the process of  inventing, says Julius, not only an architecture, an urbanism, but an entire 
disposition of  the mind in general, such that, from now on, it will be men who will be offered in 
 12 Ibid., p. 48; see also Althusser, “On Ideology,” 171–207, in On the Reproduction of  Capitalism: 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (New York: Verso, 2014), pp. 190–91.
 13 Althusser, “On Ideology,” p. 190 n.24.
 14 Althusser, “On Ideology,” 171–207, in On the Reproduction of  Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses (New York: Verso, 2014), p. 178.
 15 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 16.
 16 Ibid.
 17 I have no doubt Foucault had Guy Debord in mind.  See Foucault, The Punitive Society, p. 38 n.4; 
Harcourt, Exposed, p. 88–89.
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spectacle to a small number of  people, at the limit to only one man destined to surveil them all. 
The spectacle turned into surveillance, the circle that citizens formed around the spectacle—all 
that is reversed.  We have here a completely different structure where men who are placed next to 
each other on a flat surface will be surveilled from above by someone who will become a kind of  
universal eye.18
The universal watching eye of  the prison guard in the central watchtower of  the panop-
ticon prison became Foucault’s metaphor for the circulation of  power in modern society.  And 
so he would ask, rhetorically, two years later in Discipline and Punish, “Is it surprising that 
the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of  surveillance 
and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of  the 
judge, should have become the modern instrument of  penality?  Is it surprising that prisons 
resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”19
In both Foucault and Althusser, then, there is this repressive hangover—a source of  ten-
sion that would place both Foucault and Althusser in a tense relationship with the work of  
Deleuze and Guattari.  But here, I will jump forward and skip that episode.
II. Foucault’s Return to Subjectivity: A Possible Overcoming
Several years later, Foucault would undergo another important movement in his thought 
that would take him from the close examination of  the “arts of  governing” to an analysis of  
the “arts of  living.”  The shift began in earnest in 1980, though the trajectory there would be 
somewhat more circuitous.  Let me propose here a schematic sketch.
After exploring the emergence of  disciplinary power in the nineteenth century in his 
Collège de France lectures on The Punitive Society (1972–73) and Psychiatric Power (1973–74), 
as well as in his 1975 book Discipline and Punish, Foucault would turn his attention to more 
contemporary forms of  power and governmentality—namely biopower and the neoliberal 
management of  populations—in his book, History of  Sexuality, Volume I, and his 1976 lec-
tures.  In order to understand contemporary forms of  biopower, Foucault would trace a gene-
alogy of  neoliberal forms of  rationality, starting in his 1978 lectures on Security, Territory, 
Population—a genealogy that runs through pastoral power, raison d’État, the police, and 
liberal and neoliberal thought.  As he explained in 1979, in The Birth of  Biopolitics, under-
standing neoliberal rationality is an essential building block to analyzing the concepts of  
populations and biopower.20
 18 Foucault, La société punitive, p. 25.
 19 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 228.
 20 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, p. 24.
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Foucault meant to return directly to that project by analyzing biopolitics in 1980, which 
was his original proposal as evidenced by the title of  the 1980 lectures On the Government 
of  the Living (which he penned in Spring 1979).  He fully intended to continue where he had 
left off  the year before and return to biopolitics—in other words, to resume the investigation 
he had initially set for himself  for the 1978–1979 term, but that he had not yet gotten to.  As 
he indicated the previous year, on January 10, 1979, he had intended to focus his 1979 lectures 
on the core question of  the government of  “populations,” but needed to first understand 
neoliberalism before getting there:
“I thought I could do a course on biopolitics this year,” Foucault said in January 1979.  “But it seems 
to me that the analysis of  biopolitics can only get under way when we have understood the general 
regime of  this governmental reason I have talked about […] Consequently, it seems to me that it 
is only when we understand what is at stake in this regime of  liberalism opposed to raison 
d’État … only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able 
to grasp what biopolitics is.”21
It seems clear, then, that the title he gave in Spring 1979 for his next lectures, On the 
Government of  the Living, was intended to continue the work on biopolitics by directly 
addressing the topic of  the government of  the living.22
Instead, however, Foucault goes back in history to resume his work on the genealogy of  
the arts of  governing, which he had begun in February 1978.  This is the “double movement” 
I refer to elsewhere23: Foucault returns to an earlier archive—namely Sophocles, the Stoics, 
and the early Christian pastoral—in order to reexamine the genealogy of  our contemporary 
neoliberal forms of  rationality, by digging deeper into the forms of  truth-telling and mani-
festations of  truth that are inextricably linked to regimes of  truth.
The return to Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex is telling, not only because it is a return to the 
theme of  the “will to know” from the 1970–71 lectures, but also because that was precisely 
where he had, in some sense, left off  in 1978.  At the very beginning of  his genealogy 
of  the arts of  governing on February 8, 1978, in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault 
explored the different forms of  government in ancient Greece—discussing the “metaphor 
of  the rudder, the helmsman, the pilot, and the person who steers the ship”24—with a special 
attention to Oedipus Rex.  At that point, right after discussing Oedipus, Foucault declares: 
“I do not think that the idea that one could govern men, or that one did govern men, was a 
 21 Foucault, Birth of  Biopolitics, pp. 21–22.
 22 Foucault, On the Government of  the Living, course context, p. 327.
 23 http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/foucault1313/2016/02/07/introducing-on-the-government-of-the-living/
 24 Security, Territory, Population, p. 122.
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Greek idea.  If  I have the time and courage I will come back to this problem, either at the end 
of  these lectures or in the next series of  lectures…”25
But the 1980 lectures, in fact, pick up right there.  They represent a return to that ques-
tion and a reexamination—evidently casting doubt on his statement about Greek antiquity, 
as was his way: to reexamine everything.  The first four lectures in 1980, which reinterpret 
Oedipus Rex through the lens of  a manifestation of  one’s truth, serve as a corrective that then 
relaunches an inquiry into the pre-Christian East.
This has the effect of  shifting the character of  the genealogy somewhat, of  opening 
new vistas, and of  reorienting the project toward “the notion of  the government of  men by 
the truth.”26  It produces the shift from power-knowledge to the notion of  government by the 
truth or of  “regimes of  truth.”  And it pushes the inquiry past the market as measure of  
truth, legal processes, and historical narratives, to the central place of  the self—the “I,” the 
avowal in the “rituals of  manifestation of  truth”27—which will, as we know, lead Foucault 
toward the avowal, the examination of  self, the direction of  others, forms of  truth telling, and 
eventually parrhesia.
The next year’s lectures, Subjectivité et vérité in 1981, explicitly pursues the line of  
research begun the previous year, focused specifically on the domain of  ancient Greek and 
Roman sexuality, or rather, aphrodisia (since, as he explained, the term sexuality is a mod-
ern one and therefore anachronistic).  The central question of  the 1981 lectures is: “How to 
‘govern oneself’ through actions of  which one is oneself  the objective, the domain on which 
they apply, the instrument that they use, and the subject that acts?”28  To address this question, 
Foucault returns to texts from the period of  Greek and Roman antiquity and late Antiquity, 
ranging from Plato’s Alcibiades and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, to Hippocrates and 
Xenophon, to Cicero’s De finibus, Plutarch, Pliny the Elder, and Hierocles, to Artemidorus’ 
The Interpretation of  Dreams and the Physiologus (both circa 200 CE), in order to study the 
modes of  ancient living through detailed analyses of  marriage, marital life, and marital sex, 
the questions of  sexual penetration, pederasty, monogamy, and incest, among others.
But what becomes increasingly evident as this research unfolds is that, while Foucault is 
pursuing the line of  inquiry he had begun the year before, we begin to witness an important 
displacement in his thought from an earlier focus, beginning in 1977 and extending to 1980, 
on the “arts of  governing,” to a more concerted focus on the “arts of  living.” In other words, 
there is an increasing interiority to the object of  these arts, of  these techne.  While much of  
 25 Security, Territory, Population, p. 123.  At that point in 1978, Foucault turns to the pre-Christian 
East and spiritual direction, the pastoral.
 26 Foucault, On the Government of  the Living, p. 11.
 27 Ibid., p. 6.
 28 Subjectivité et vérité, p. 299.
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the earlier work on madness, the clinic, and the prison—and even, to a certain extent, the 
first volume on sexuality—examined the conduct of  conduct by others, Foucault’s deepened 
attention to subjectivity begins to produce a slight shift toward the conduct of  conduct by 
oneself.  This can be felt in reading the lectures: they are increasingly about arts of  living; 
about modes of  existence that are more internal.  They are about what Foucault calls “la 
façon de se conduire, les modes de vie, les manières d’être,” “les arts de vivre, l’art de se con-
duire,” “les modèles de conduite,” or “ces consignes d’existence.”29  We have shifted ground, 
somewhat, to modes of  life.
In the case of  madness, or the clinic, or the prison, Foucault maintained, “the core of  
truthful discourse regarding the self  was held from the outside, by an other”—by the psy-
chiatrist, by the doctor, the social worker, actuarian, or warden.  By contrast, in the domain of  
aphrodesia, the truthful discourse on the self  is institutionalized in an entirely different way: 
by the subject reflecting on oneself.  “That is to say,” Foucault explains, “it is not organized 
on the basis of  an observation or examination, or of  objective rules, but rather around the 
practice of  avowal,”30 on the basis of  a more internal or internalized reflection; on the basis 
of  something that we, ourselves, tell ourselves about ourselves.  It is unlike the doctor who 
tells us we are mad, nor like the psychiatrist who tells us we are dangerous; rather, it is we 
ourselves who talk about our own desires, about what we desire.
This represents a subtle shift.  Foucault’s lengthy treatment of  Artemidorus’ The 
Interpretation of  Dreams is, of  course, signaling to others how they should interiorize sex 
acts that augur well—surely, this is governing by the other too.  But the focus is less on par-
ticular behaviors (what Foucault refers to as “les arts du comportement,” which he associates 
with the modern period), than on modes of  being, on “the being that we are,” or “a certain 
quality of  being, a certain modality of  experiencing.”31  This does not mean that other per-
sons do not play an important role; the director of  conscience, the spiritual guide is a central 
figure.  But nevertheless, as Foucault explains:
Every art of  living implicates that not only does one learn, but, as we would say with our vocabu-
lary, we interiorize.  En tout cas il faut que l’on pense soi-même, que l’on réfléchisse dessus, que 
l’on médite.”32
This subtle movement from the “arts of  governing” to the “arts of  living” serves to 
reframe Foucault’s research project in relation to the bios of  biopolitics.  Foucault comes back 
 29 Subjectivité et vérité, p. 29.
 30 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
 31 Ibid., p. 33.
 32 Ibid., p. 34.
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to bios, which he suggests is the closest Greek concept to our modern notion of  subjectivity, 
on March 25, 1981.33
Bios is still central here—corresponding to the Greek term for these arts of  living, of  
how to conduct oneself—but it has taken on a slightly different valence from the earlier atten-
tion to “populations” to a new focus on techniques of  the self.  The manuscript of  the 1981 
lectures proposes a fascinating trajectory from biopolitics in relation to the normalization of  
sexual behaviors, to biopoetics in relation to a “personal fabrication of  one’s own life” and 
“aesthetical-moral conduct of  individual existence,” and ultimately to biotechniques, a term 
which Foucault uses in the public lectures.34
From biopolitics, then, to biopoetics, to biotechniques or techniques of  the self, or technolo-
gies of  the self: this is the path that Foucault takes in the final lectures to explore what, he 
tells us, the Greeks and the Romans practiced under the rubric “tekhnai peri bion (techniques 
of  living).”35
III. Power and Desire in the Digital Age
The “techniques of  living”: these, I would argue, are highly probative to understand our 
present digital age.  This is not because there is less repression today.  With drone strikes and 
tortured confessions at Guantánamo and black sites around the globe, with police shootings, 
inner-city violence, and NSA surveillance, we live in a fully repressive world.  However, the 
forms of  governmentality today operate, for large segments of  the population, through the 
more subtle mechanisms of  our shared modes of  living.
Today, we are not so much interpellated by the hailing police officer, nor confined to 
the panoptic cell, as we are projecting ourselves willingly on the plasma and digital screens 
around the globe.  As I argue in Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (Harvard 
2015), we live in a different age today: one in which power circulates differently.  Today, a new 
digital way of  life dominates in most advanced-capitalist liberal democracies.  It is a digitized, 
cosmopolitan condition that is captured, almost entirely, by electronic communications—a 
rich social, professional, personal and political circuit of  text messages and e-mails, digital 
photos and scans, PDFs, Skype calls, Facebook, and Twitter, a world of  Google searches and 
Bings, and pings, and Snapchats, of  digital subscriptions, Flickr photos, Vimeos, and Vines, 
of  Instagrams, YouTube videos, and webcams.  And with it, embedded within it, there is 
a whole technology of  virtual transparence that allows for pervasive data-mining, digital 
profiling, facial-recognition, Amazon recommendations, eBay offers, Google algorithms, and 
 33 Ibid., p. 255.
 34 Ibid., p. 37 n.a.
 35 Ibid., p. 37.
WAKING UP FROM MAY ’68 AND THE REPRESSIVE HANGOVER
25
NSA surveillance.  It is a new world in which we expose ourselves, our every activity, and 
our most intimate desires, inescapably, to the technological capabilities of  the market and the 
state.  For many of  us, we are drawn in, even hesitantly, through our lust: this digital space 
seduces us into buying the most recent smart phone, downloading an irresistible application, 
clicking on a tantalizing image, giving free rein to our curiosity, addictions, fetishes, and 
ambitions.  It recommends things to us we did not even know we wanted, but, it turns out, 
we do want.
In 1984, the fundamental strategy of  oppression was to eradicate desire.  With its Junior 
Anti-Sex Leagues that advocated complete celibacy and drive to abolish the orgasm, the cen-
tral tactic was to neutralize the passions of  the men and women of  Oceania; to wear them 
down into submission with the smell of  boiled cabbage and old rag mats, coarse soap, and 
blunt razors.  The goal was to replace jouissance with hate: “hate” sessions, “hate songs,” 
“hate weeks.”
Today, by contrast, everything functions by means of  “likes,” “shares,” “favorites,” 
“friending,” and “following.”  No telescreen is forced upon us; instead we gleefully hang smart 
TVs on the wall that record all our preferences and even our words.  The drab uniform and 
grim gray walls in 1984 have been replaced by the iPhone 6C in its radiant pink, yellow, blue, 
and green.  “Colorful through and through,” its marketing slogan promises, and it is precisely 
the desire for color-filled objects—for the sensual swoosh of  a sent email, the seductive click 
of  the iPhone camera “shutter,” and the “Likes,” clicks, and Tweets that can be earned by 
sharing—that seduce us into delivering ourselves to the surveillance technologies.
In all this, we are not so much being coerced, surveilled, or secured today, as we are expos-
ing or exhibiting ourselves knowingly, many of  us willingly, with all our love, lust, passion, 
and politics, others anxiously, ambivalently, even perhaps despite ourselves—but still, know-
ingly exposing ourselves.  The relation of  power is inverted: we, digital subjects—we, “digital 
persons,”36 “digital selves,”37 “data doubles,”38 homo digitalis, we give ourselves up in a mad 
frenzy of  disclosure.  Many of  us exhibit our most intimate details in play, in love, in desire, 
in consumption, in the social and in the political, throughout our rich digital lives—through 
our appetites, in our work, for our political convictions—to become ourselves.  Even those of  
us who do not partake in the seductive world of  social media often have no alternative but to 
share our intimate lives and political views in texts, e-mails, and Skype conversations, know-
ing that we are exposing ourselves.  Everything is now digitized to more easily scan, share, 
 36 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006).
 37 Shanyang Zhao, “The Digital Self: Through the Looking Glass of  Telecopresent Others,” Symbolic 
Interaction, vol. 28, issue 3, 387–405 (2005).
 38 See Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, “The surveillant assemblage,” British Journal of  
Sociology, vol. 51(4), 605–622 (2000), 611.
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transfer, copy, and send around the world our most private thoughts and desires, to our loved 
ones, our children, parents and siblings, our partners, our comrades, our colleagues, and our 
enemies.  We write love notes and political comments, we share intimate photos and inside 
jokes, and we throw ourselves onto the screen in our virtual spectacular forms, often wishing 
more than anything to be seen, to be “Liked,” to feel connected, or simply because it is the 
only way to communicate today in advanced capitalist liberal democracies.  For most of  us, 
our digital existence has become our life—it is practically the pulse, the bloodstream, the very 
current of  our daily routines.  We need to be plugged not just to feel fully alive, but to function 
at work and at home—to be human, all too human.
We live today in an expository society, not just in a panoptic society.  And this gives 
rise to new regimes of  punishment that we need to study fully cognizant of  the role that 
we, ourselves, play in it all.  This is, I think, where we are today: not just in the fold of  
repression—though there is plenty of  that—but also in the act of  exposure.  And in this new 
space, we need to pay special attention to our avowals and truth-telling, as Foucault did in 
his later lectures.
Peter Brooks discusses this in his study of  the confessional form in Troubling Confessions. 
Brooks returns to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions—as he does to St. Augustine’s—but 
in the case of  Rousseau, he presciently underscores the expository dimension of  the confes-
sions.  Returning to Rousseau’s telling of  the account of  the stolen ribbon, Brooks observes 
that “confession as a speech accomplishes something other than the simple revelation of  
a truth.”39  The themes of  exposure, but also guilt and absolution, loom large in the account. 
Brooks draws on Paul de Man’s classic reflections on the stolen ribbon, in which de Man 
writes: “What Rousseau really wanted is neither the ribbon, nor Marion [the potential love 
interest], but the public scene of  exposure which he actually gets….  The more there is to 
expose, the more there is to be ashamed of; the more resistance to exposure, the more sat-
isfying the scene, and especially, the more satisfying and eloquent the belated revelation, in 
the later narrative, of  the inability to reveal.”40  Brooks’ analysis builds on this, and provides 
texture to the act of  avowal: “In other words, this primal scene of  exposure, shame, guilt, is 
absolutely necessary to the project of  making a confession, and if  the scene never occurred, 
one would have to invent something like it in order to motivate and perform the writing of  
the Confessions.”41
 39 Brooks, Troubling Confessions, p. 20.
 40 Paul de man quoted in Brooks, p. 20.
 41 Brooks, p. 21.
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IV. Overcoming the Repressive Hangover
To explore this further, it might be interesting to consider two recent Internet phenomena 
in order to get a closer look at how power circulates through clicks and downloads, attention 
and distraction, desire and jouissance today.
A. “Damn, Daniel!”
The first is the most recent Internet phenomenon, which exploded in February 2016 
in the United States.  It was a short video made on an iPhone using Snapchat, of  a young 
man, Daniel Lara (aged 14), caught on camera on successive days, showing off  his stylish 
shoes, with an overlaid voice, each day and each time, saying “Damn, Daniel!” On particular 
snippets, when Daniel is wearing particular shoes—white slip-on Vans—the voiceover says 
“Damn, Daniel! Back at it again with those white Vans!”
The short video, only 30-seconds long, was made public on February 15, 2016, and went 
viral in matter of  days.  It had over 45 million views by the time the two boys—Daniel and 
Joshua Holtz (aged 15)—were invited on the Ellen Degeneres Show on February 24, 2016. 
The boys have become overnight celebrities because of  the supposed catchiness of  the meme 
“Damn, Daniel!” You can watch the video42 here: https://youtu.be/tvk89PQHDIM.
Within days, songs and remixes were being written and produced using the meme; rap-
pers Little, Teej, and LeBlanc created a track using the meme, raising issues of  race and 
white privilege; another remix was by Suhmeduh.  Celebrities as far and wide as Justin 
Bieber, Kanye West, and Kim Kardashian are sporting white Vans, riffing off  the meme. 
On February 25, 2016, the New York Times (yes, the Times is writing about it!), referring 
to the video as “the latest Internet sensation,” reported that “Daniel said that he can’t even 
go to the mall or a swim meet without being asked for photos with his fans or getting mar-
riage proposals.”
Only twelve days since the video had been released, on February 27, 2016, it is hard to 
keep up with all of  the fallout from the meme—positive (Ellen gave Daniel a life time sup-
ply of  Vans) and negative (Joshua Holtz, for instance, just got swatted).  Although easily 
dismissed as just “entertaining nonsense”—that’s how the New York Times starts its article 
about the Internet phenomenon, describing it as “a meme ris[ing] up from the wondrous bog 
of  entertaining nonsense that is the Internet”—there is in fact a lot going on with the “Damn, 
Daniel!” meme.
For instance, it reeks of  neoliberal consumerism, with the focus on Daniel’s different 
daily fashionable shoes.  Daniel sports a different pair of  new shoes practically every day, 




on the phenomenon, according to the Times; but they certainly have benefited commercially. 
They could not have produced a more effective commercial! The whole phenomenon centers 
on consumption and the commercialization of  those white Vans, masquerading under the 
surface of  popularity.
There is a clear racial dimension to the meme as well.  It is filmed by white boys at a lily-
white high school in Riverside, California, and has all the trappings of  white privilege: sunny, 
monied, fashionable, blond-haired, white boys.  The rappers Little Feat, Teej & LeBlanc make 
the racial dimensions clear in their take, suggesting that black kids might not so easily get 
away with the same things, rapping as well on the racial-sexual innuendos surrounding the 
phenomenon.  “Back at it again with the white Vans.  Back at it again with the black Vans. 
[…] Black canvas with the black stiches and the white slit […] Lunch table with some white 
bitches, after school with some white bitches, sniffing lines with them white bitches…” The 
white vans symbolize, for these rappers, white privilege.  “Vans on, they are Mr. Clean.”
But notice that all of  these neoliberal, political, racial, consumerist dimensions are played 
out through a process of  addictive web surfing, clicking, and downloading.  As of  February 
22, 2016, seven days in, it had 260,000 retweets and 330,000 “likes” on Twitter.  The official 
YouTube version had almost 1.5 million views on February 27, 2016, with 13,617 “likes.”
The whole experience is proceeding through hundreds of  thousands of  “likes” and 
tens of  millions of  “shares,” “follows,” and “clicks.” It plays out as a mode of  life.  A style 
of  existence.  The pool.  The white Vans.  The swim team.  The girls.  And what is not in the 
picture?  The political economy surrounding how those white Vans are produced and make 
their way to the poolside at Riverside High School, or the differential treatment that young 
black teenagers get at their high school.  All of  the politics are elided behind the pleasure of  
the meme.
b. Donald Trump
Without in any way being dismissive of  the campaign or supporters of  the then- 
presidential candidate Donald Trump, I believe it is fair to say that the Trump phenomenon 
is in large part the product of  virtual reality and social media.  Trump has succeeded in 
drawing attention precisely because he is a master of  reality TV and a great communicator 
on social media.
Trump has reached such a wide audience by means of  his Tweets and reality TV snip-
pets.  The cable news network CNN captures this best in a pithy lead to a story titled “Trump: 
The social media president?”:
FDR was the first “radio” president.  JFK emerged as the first “television” president.  Barack 
Obama broke through as the first “Internet” president.
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Next up?  Prepare to meet Donald Trump, possibly the first “social media” and “reality TV” president.43
Trump’s campaign was unique in this sense and his success has been directly related, 
in my opinion, to his masterful command of  reality TV—his commanding performances 
on The Apprentice and Celebrity Apprentice, and other entertainment venues.  Trump has 
become such a social media phenomenon, that even when he did not participate in one of  the 
Republican debates, that very night he dominated the other candidates in terms of  searches 
on the Internet and social media postings.44
Now, this new media form is not all positive.  Much of  it is based on forms of  hatred. 
Trumps’ comments about not letting any Muslims into the country or his derogatory com-
ments about Mexican immigrants to the United States—suggesting that they are all rapists 
and murderers—play on racial prejudice, religious bias, and ethnic hatred.  It is important to 
underscore the Orwellian hatred here.
And a lot of  the attention on the Internet is “gawker” interest: the curiosity of  the freak 
show, of  the extreme position.  Recently, Trump was caught unwittingly retweeting a quote 
from Benito Mussolini—it was a ruse set up by the website Gawker intended to trap Trump. 
Trump himself, however, did not miss a beat, and when asked by a news network whether 
he wanted to be associated with Mussolini, Trump responded: “No, I want to be associated 
with interesting quotes.”45  According to the report, Trump then added that “he does ‘interest-
ing things’ on his social media accounts, which have racked up ‘almost 14 million’ followers 
combined, and, ‘Hey, it got your attention, didn’t it?’”
“It got your attention”: that is the new modus operandi of  a social mediatized political 
campaign, and it is shaping the way in which citizens consume politics.  Van Jones at CNN 
captures this phenomenon most succinctly in these words: “The Trump phenomenon flab-
bergasts pundits like me.  We thought the billionaire was leaving the world of  Entertainment, 
climbing over a wall and joining us in the sober domain of  Politics.  But in fact, the opposite 
happened.  “Trump, The Entertainer” stayed exactly where he was.  Instead, he pulled the 
political establishment over the wall and into HIS domain.  The political class is now lost in 
the world of  reality television and social media.”46
To analyze how power circulates in the digital age today, it is crucial to understand how 




 45 “Donald Trump’s social media strategy?  ‘Be associated with interesting quotes.’”  The Week, 
February 28, 2016 availabel here: http://theweek.com/speedreads/609090/donald-trumps-social-
media-strategy-associated-interesting-quotes
 46 Van Jones, “Trump: The social media president?”
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contemporary subjects are drawn to information and data, all of  which shape them in their 
deepest subjectivities.  Whether it is the consumerism of  the white Vans or the attention-
grabbing brashness of  Donald Trump, these new forms of  Internet dissemination play on 
other registers than repression, or even the repressive hangover.
This is not to suggest that all Internet meme phenomena are neoliberal consumerist, 
politically vapid, or devoid of  public interest.  Many people, for instance, have been influ-
enced by Mark Zuckerberg in his capacity as—what the New York Times calls—a “lifestyle 
guru,” and many of  his lifestyle choices have an altruistic dimension to them.  His New 
Year’s resolutions, in particular, seem to speak to many Facebook users.  Those resolutions, 
however, are sometimes other-regarding or enlightened.  For example, in 2011, Zuckerberg 
vowed to only eat meat that he himself  had slaughtered; in 2014, he resolved to write a thank 
you note every day of  the year; and in 2015, he promised to start up a book club and read a 
new title every two weeks.47  Those who follow his lead, who call themselves “brogrammers,” 
are accordingly brought into the fold, but that fold seems less troubling—at least one might 
think—than wearing fashionable shoes or simply looking as good as a Valley teenager.
Regardless, the appreciation of  the subjective dimensions of  these digital influences is 
key to understanding our current condition.  And in this regard, the late lectures of  Foucault 
may be extremely enlightening.  As Daniele Lorenzini suggests, on the Foucault 13/13 blog, 
they help identify and address a real problem for us today, namely, the problem that resides in:
la structuration de la subjectivité de la masse des individus qui, aujourd’hui, participent active-
ment — consciemment ou pas, volontairement ou pas (mais comment pourrait-on se soustraire 
à cela ?) — aux mécanismes gouvernementaux [d’une société d’exposition]… Si la subjectivité 
de l’individu-consommateur-utilisateur de Google/Facebook/Twitter etc. est effectivement forgée 
aujourd’hui autour d’un désir de s’exposer au regard des autres, même si la plupart de nous sait 
très bien que cette exposition « volontaire » (et pourtant combien « incitée » !) de soi est l’un 
des moyens principaux que l’on utilise pour nous conduire, pour nous gouverner, eh bien alors 
les travaux de Foucault des années 1970–1980, et notamment le cours [Sur le gouvernement des 
vivants], peuvent encore jouer pour nous un rôle fondamental.  […]
Je suis convaincu que cette généalogie [de l’homme de désir], que Foucault n’a retracée qu’en partie, 
est cruciale pour essayer de comprendre pourquoi et comment, aujourd’hui, nous sommes encore 
gouvernés (et constitués : assujettis/subjectivés) en tant que sujets de désir.  En d’autres termes, 
le « désir » de s’exposer, d’avouer perpétuellement ce que nous sommes en train de penser et de 
 47 Matt Haber, “For These Guys, Mark Zuckerberg Is a Lifestyle Guru, New York Times, February 
27, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/fashion/mens-style/mark-zuckerberg-
lifestyle-guru.html
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faire — moyen essentiel du gouvernement des êtres humains dans notre digital age —, mérite sans 
doute d’être interrogé aussi (je ne dis pas exclusivement) en reprenant, en prolongeant, en corrige-
ant si nécessaire, la généalogie foucaldienne de l’homme de désir.  Bref, cette idée, qui nous semble 
peut-être un peu étrange, et qui pourtant continue sans doute à travailler dans les profondeurs de 
l’histoire, selon laquelle l’aveu de soi-même peut nous conduire au salut, à la guérison, au bonheur 
etc., constitue (encore) l’un des pivots, l’une des manières fondamentales par lesquelles « nous » 
sommes gouvernés. »48
Conclusion
For our current neoliberal digital regime to function, repression is, of  course, required. 
Of  that, there is no doubt.  For the political economic system to function, it requires the NYPD 
to empty out Zuccotti Park during the Occupy Wall Street movement, and Stateville Prison, 
with its panoptic cell block, to warehouse our minorities and mass incarcerated.  No, noth-
ing I have said should be understood to deny that power in the digital age functions through 
express repression—as in the case of  the PRISM program of  the NSA, the Optic Nerve pro-
gram of  the British intelligence services, both of  which I describe at length in Exposed, or 
for that matter, the use of  metadata for drone strikes.  As General Michael Hayden, former 
director of  both the NSA and the CIA, emphasizes, “We kill people based on metadata.”49
But it does mean that, to understand how power circulates today, our critical method 
should complement the study of  repressive power, as well as productive power (with its 
repressive hangover), with a closer examination of  digital desire and our new modes of  
living.  The digital age works increasingly through the attractions and distractions of  our 
inner subjectivities.
We inhabit an increasingly confessional digital world, with our selfies, our quantified 
selves, our Facebook publicity, and our reality-lives.  Our digital acts of  self-revelation betray 
our desire for attention and publicity.  The urge may not be new, but the medium changes it, 
creating a potential audience that could never have been imagined before.  The confessional 
dimensions of  this digital age involve, first, a more public, exposed confession.  These are no 
longer purely internal—like the stoic examination of  conscience at nighttime—nor limited 
to a lover or minister.  They are logged for others to see, and watch, and hear.  They have, 
second, an element of  permanence.  They will be cached somewhere, and preserved forever. 
 48 http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/foucault1313/2016/02/13/post-epilogue-the-modern-subject-of-
desire-in-french/
 49 Quoted in Cole, “Can the NSA Be Controlled?”  The New York Review of  Books, June 19, 2014, 
p. 16, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jun/19/can-nsa-be-controlled. 
As David Cole reminds us, through the words of  the NSA General Counsel, “Metadata absolutely 
tells you everything about somebody’s life.  If  you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.”
BERNARD E. HARCOURT
32
Even if  we erase them or delete them, someone will be able to find them in an unknown part 
of  our drive or cloud.  They are not fleeting or defined by their phenomenal presence.  They 
are seared into the digital in the same way that a permanent mark of  penitence might last for-
ever, tattooed on our selves.  Third, they are lighter and more malleable than the face-to-face 
confession: there is no risk of  blushing, no bodily language, no visual cues to absorb.  Their 
relationship to authenticity and fiction is looser, more supple.  We are not forced to avow in 
the digital era.  We are not required to perform at regular intervals.  There is no rule, nor cold 
showers.  We embrace avowal more entrepreneurially, made possible and magnified by the 
publicity and reach of  the new mediums—Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, Vimeo, Snapchat, 
Facebook, Vine.
In this sense, we need to finish the project that Foucault began and integrate our work 
on subjectivity back into our analyses of  repression and productive power.  We need, today, 
to combine the analysis of  digital desire and play with earlier analyses of  repression and of  
the reproduction of  power.
In the context of  Foucault’s project, it would clearly be an impoverished understanding 
of  his writings on subjectivity to view them as displacing his earlier problematics.  They 
complement, they add a necessary dimension, but they do not represent a break from earlier 
problematics.  As you will recall, Foucault expressly stated in 1984, in The Courage of  Truth, 
that it would be an impoverished reading of  his work on power-knowledge to set aside sub-
jectivity: “to depict this kind of  research as an attempt to reduce knowledge (savoir) to power, 
to make it the mask of  power in structures, where there is no place for a subject, is purely and 
simply a caricature.”50  In a similar way, it would be an impoverished reading of  Foucault’s 
work on subjectivity not to integrate it into the study of  politics and power.  In the study of  
sexuality, for instance, it would be essential to read his Volumes 2 and 3 back into Volume 1. 
That alone is what can make sense of  the full research project.
This task was, I believe, cut short by Foucault’s untimely death.  But it is, for us, I think, 
for me I know, the greatest challenge to face—not only in reading Foucault today, but more 
importantly in my own work.  In the end, it is absolutely crucial to integrate the analysis of  
repressive models of  power and productive theories of  reproduction with new theorizations 
of  power that overcome our May ’68 repressive hangover.
 50 Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, p. 10.
